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AXIARCHISM AND SELECTORS
John Russell Roberts

This essay offers a defense of Axiarchism’s answer to the question, “Why does
the world exist?” against prominent objections leveled against it by Derek
Parfit. Parfit rejects the Axiarchist answer while abstracting from it his own
Selector strategy. I argue that the abstraction fails, and that even if we were
to regard Axiarchism as an instance of a Selector hypothesis, we should regard it as the only viable one. I also argue that Parfit’s abstraction leads him
to mistake the nature and, thereby, the force of Axiarchism’s claim to being
an ultimate explanation. Finally, I defend the Axiarchist’s claim that the good
could not fail to rule.

We may be said to account for a thing when we shew
that it is so best.
—Berkeley

In “Why Anything? Why This?,” Derek Parfit evaluates a number of candidate answers to the title’s questions, i.e., “Why does anything at all exist
and why, out of all the vast number of possible universes, is this the one
that exists?”1 Among the answers examined, one plays a pivotal role in
the essay: Axiarchism. Though Parfit rejects the Axiarchist’s answer, he
abstracts from it what he thinks is a promising explanatory strategy involving what he calls “Selectors.” In the following, I will argue that the
Axiarchist’s answer cannot be abstracted so as to open the door to Parfit’s
other Selectors. Moreover, if we regard Axiarchism as an instance of a
Selector hypothesis, we should regard it as the only one with promise.
In addition, I will argue that Parfit’s abstraction leads him to mistake the
nature and, thereby, the force of Axiarchism’s claim to being an ultimate
explanation. Finally, I will defend the Axiarchist’s claim that the good
could not fail to rule and offer an assessment of where the debate between
Parfit and the Axiarchist stands in light of that defense.

1
The essay first appeared in The London Review of Books 20, no. 3, February 1998. It is
reprinted as “Appendix D” in Parfit’s On What Matters, vol. 2 (Oxford and New: OUP, 2011),
623–648.
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Abstracting Axiarchism
In brief, Axiarchism is the view that the world exists because it is good
that it exist. That is to say, the world exists because it ought to, where the
“ought” is the ethical “ought.”2 Is this, in the end, a fundamentally different claim from the more familiar view that the world exists because it
is good, but is brought into existence by the power of a divine personal
agent? No quick answer is available. On the one hand, the leading contemporary exponent of Axiarchism, John Leslie, sees it and theism as
enjoying a rather friendly relationship. He suggests that God, as the perfect being, may be what is immediately required by the principle, and
then in turn God would be responsible for creating everything else.3 Other
proponents, however, insist that Axiarchism does not appeal to an agent
of any kind, but rather to something abstract in nature. Nicholas Rescher,
another prominent advocate, insists that his version of Axiarchism, what
he calls, “Axiogenesis,” invites “[n]o such anthropomorphism.” As he sees
it, “[th]e real emerges from the manifold of possibility, a modus operandi
that is altogether natural.”4 Then again, there is a long tradition of Christian Platonism—ultimately inspired by Plato and Plotinus, but much of it
travelling through the Christian Neoplantonist Pseudo-Dionysius—that
is deeply inspired by axiarchic considerations. Some in this tradition see
Axiarchism as providing insight into God’s basic nature and the nature of
divine power. The most deliberate development of this idea is to be found,
I believe, in Ralph Cudworth’s work, where he attempts to use axiarchism
to give an account of the nature of personal agency, both human and
Divine.5 Regardless, Parfit treats Axiarchism as appealing to an abstract
principle that the best ought to be, not to a personal agent. Consequently,
for the purposes of this paper, we will just assume that this is correct.
Despite the fact that Axiarchism is at least as old as Plato and has exerted a profound influence throughout most of our philosophical history,
philosophers now are typically dismissive of it. Parfit, however, is not. As
2
John Leslie offers a version of this kind of Axiarchism. My presentation of the view here
is deeply indebted to his. See his Value and Existence (Totowa, NJ: Roman and Littlefield,
1979). However, I should not be read as presenting Leslie’s own views; any short-comings in
my exposition of Axiarchism or in its defense are entirely my own.
3
His view has changed somewhat more recently. He now thinks that it doesn’t affect what
one actually believes, whether “God” is taken to be the name of a creative force of ethical
requirement or the name for whatever one thinks owes its existence to such a force. See
Chapter 5 of Infinite Minds (New York: Oxford, 2001). However, Leslie is more often interpreted as actually advocating that it is abstract Platonic entities that are responsible for the
world’s existence. See, most recently, Timothy O’Connor’s discussion in Theism and Ultimate
Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 76–77.
4
Axiogenesis: An Essay in Metaphysical Optimalism (Totowa, NJ: Roman and Littlefield
2010), 140.
5
See his True Intellectual System of the Universe (Andover: Gould and Newman 1838),
passim. This approach, which seeks to identify the Good (axiarchically conceived) with the
traditional conception of God, has the advantage of being able to cite God as the truth-maker
for Axiarchism’s claims that such and such is best. Leslie’s approach might also allow this,
but it is more difficult to assess.
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he sees it, there is some explanatory power here, but it needs to be honed
in on. To this end, he breaks the view down into three claims:
(1) It would be best if reality were a certain way.
(2) Reality is that way.
(3) (1) explains (2).6
Neither (1) nor (2) is unique to Axiarchism and it is clear enough what
they are claiming. (3), the claim that (2) is true because of (1), is Axiarchism’s
distinctive claim and so he proposes that we simply allow both (1) and (2)
so as to focus on it. But (3) poses a challenge. What sense of “because” is
the Axiarchist appealing to in claiming that the world exists because it is
good? Despite the apparent difficulty of understanding the nature of the
explanation offered by (3), Parfit advises that we not be too quick to write
it off. After all, we are seeking an answer to an extraordinary question, an
explanation for the whole of reality. It’s not unreasonable to suspect that
the answer itself might be extraordinary in some way. If we hope to make
progress here, we should keep an open mind.
With this in view, Parfit then attempts to extract what he takes to be the
valuable aspect of the Axiarchist’s explanatory strategy.
Axiarchism might be expressed as follows. We are now supposing that of all
the ways that the whole of reality might be, one is both the very best, and
is the way that reality is. On the Axiarchist View, that is no coincidence. This
claim, I believe, makes sense.7

That is not to say that he accepts the Axiarchist’s answer. Axiarchism’s
(3) can only be the explanation of the world’s existence if the world does,
in fact, possess the characteristic of being the best. Parfit rejects the view
not because of (3) but because of (2). There is just too much seemingly
pointless suffering in the world for it to be true that value rules. However, for the sake of assessing the explanatory value of Axiarchism, Parfit
simply allows that this is the best of all possible worlds.8
It should be mentioned at this point that any Axiarchist will readily
agree that the presence of evil in this world, or even just anything less
than the best, is both the most obvious and the most serious challenge
the view faces. But we should also note that there is a long, rich, and (we
might add) still developing history of theistic responses to the problem of
evil that Axiarchists can and do adapt for their own purposes. Naturally,
Parfit’s objection would have to deal with these to be successful. But set
this aside. We will return to it at the very end of the paper.
Instead, let’s focus on Parfit’s suggestion that in Axiarchism we get an
instance of a general explanatory strategy with some promise. To draw it
Parfit, On What Matters, 633.
Ibid., 633–634.
8
N.B., the Axiarchic claim under consideration here is not that their view is more plausible and therefore it’s more likely that ours is the best of all worlds.
6
7
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out, we just need to “abstract from the optimism of the Axiarchist View.”9
That gives us this:
Of the countless cosmic possibilities, one both has some very special feature,
and is the possibility that obtains. That is no coincidence. This possibility
obtains because it has this feature.10

Parfit then reviews a number of hypotheses that fit this form of explanation. For instance, one such very special feature might be Maximality.
Suppose the world is such that it allows for the greatest number of possible beings to be actual. Well, if reality is, in fact, as full as possible, then
it might be no coincidence that both these things are true. The suggestion
is that the most full world might exist precisely because it has this feature.
Maximality would then be a “Selector.” So, according to Maximality, there
is a fundamental principle that “being possible and part of the fullest way
that reality could be, is sufficient for being actual.”11 In this sense, the
world would exist because it was “selected” for this feature. Or to go in the
opposite direction, if it were the case that nothing existed, then that might
be no coincidence. Leibniz believed just plain nothingness would be the
simplest of possibilities.12 So, on this, the Null View, perhaps Simplicity
would be the Selector. Accordingly, the Null hypothesis would appeal to
a fundamental principle to the effect that being the simplest possibility is
enough for being actual. Of course, we know the Null hypothesis to be
false. Maybe the Maximality hypothesis has legs. But so may other Selectors. Each will have to be judged on its merits. Regardless, the upshot
is that the abstraction from Axiarchism has yielded a potentially viable
explanatory approach to the question, “Why does the world exist?”.
Why the Abstraction Fails
The problem Parfit faces is that abstracting from Axiarchism in this way
abstracts away all the explanatory power. If we allow that Axiarchism is
a Selector hypothesis then we should regard it as the only one with any
promise.
Recall Parfit’s simplification of the Axiarchist’s answer:
(1) It would be best if reality were a certain way.
(2) Reality is that way.
(3) (1) explains (2).
According to what Parfit tells us, the abstracted version would be:

Parfit, On What Matters, 634
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 636.
12
G. W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” 7, in Philosophical
Essays, ed. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 210.
9

10
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(4) Of the countless cosmic possibilities, one has some very special feature.
(5) Reality is that way.
(6) (4) explains (5).
I take it from this that Parfit intends (1) and (1*) to be equivalent.
(1*) Of all the countless cosmic possibilities, one has the very special
feature of being the best that could exist.
But this way of wording it masks the vital core of the Axiarchist’s
answer, because the wording of (1*) masks what’s so special about Axiarchism’s special feature by mimicking the form of a merely descriptive
claim. But, of course, the Axiarchist is making use of the claim that the
best ought to exist. According to Axiarchism, (1) is an evaluative claim that
is more perspicuously expressed by (1**),
(1**) Of all the cosmic possibilities, one has the very special feature of
being the one that ought to exist.13
Therein lies the heart of the Axiarchist explanatory strategy. The reason
Plato, Plotinus and so many others looked to the ethical realm to explain
why the world exists is because there is an intrinsic connection between
goodness and being. Maximality, Simplicity, Mathematical Elegance, what
have you, might qualify as special in some sense of “special,” but only the
good is special in the relevant way.
To see this, it helps to see that the Axiarchist is exploiting three points.
First, ethical facts are necessary. God could no more make benevolence evil,
or wanton cruelty good, than He could make a round square.14 Second,
these necessary ethical facts are, if you will, directed to being. For contrast,
consider another necessary claim, such as that if there are three cats and
they are joined by four more cats, there will be seven cats.15 While perfectly necessary, that fact says nothing at all about the existence of those
cats, one way or the other. But the necessary ethical facts have a built-in
connection with existence. The good should be. And the bad should not
be. The best world should exist. The worst world should not exist. Third,
ethical claims aren’t just directed to being, they make demands on it. They
say things must be a certain way; it is necessary for them to be a certain
way. The best world must exist. The worst world must not. This necessity is,
of course, ethical necessity, but the Axiarchist’s admittedly extraordinary
proposal, the part addressed to our extraordinary question, is the claim
13
Parfit is, of course, perfectly well aware of the fact that (1) is an evaluative claim. He
explicitly identifies it as such. (On What Matters, 633). My claim is that the abstracting process
seems to have served to obscure the importance of this point as Parfit’s discussion proceeds.
14
Axiarchism is, of course, predicated upon the falsity of voluntarism.
15
The example is just a variation on of one of Leslie’s. See Immortality Defended (Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007) 34.

AXIARCHISM AND SELECTORS

417

that perhaps it is a metaphysical necessity that this ethical demand itself is
creatively efficacious.16 However extraordinary that claim is, the key point
is that it is based upon a real, intrinsic connection between Axiarchism’s
choice of a Selector, and a necessity for something to exist. And necessity, at
least some kind of necessity, is presumably what we want.17 We are, after
all, looking for an ultimate explanation of why the world exists. We don’t
want to leave room for any why-questions to linger about.18
With that in mind, contrast Axiarchism’s answer with, for instance,
Maximality’s Selector and its filling in of (4).
(M) Of the countless cosmic possibilities, one is as full as possible,
and Maximality’s Fundamental Principle,
(MFP) The world must be as full as possible.
One immediately wants to know what the Maximalist proposes is the
intrinsic connection between (M) being the fullest world and, (MFP), the
necessity for such a world to exist? No answer is forthcoming. Maximality’s Selector, the feature of being as full as possible, says nothing one way
or the other about the existence of that world. It only tells us something
about its denizens; it simply tells us that if it exists, there are as many
as possible. Nothing about this feature tells us why this world would
exist. The same goes for the other Selectors. That a world is, for instance,
the Most Mathematically Elegant, tells us nothing about why this world
would exist rather than nothing, let alone why this world would exist
rather than some other. And it certainly tells us nothing about the necessity for this world to exist. The other Selectors simply don’t carry an
intrinsic reason for being with them. No other Selector has Axiarchism’s
natural connection with the necessity for something to exist. Consequently,
Axiarchism would seem to be the only Selector which brings to the table
anything resembling the kind of explanatory power we are looking for.
So much then for my first objection; Axiarchism is the only Selector
hypothesis with any promise.

16
The proposal is not that “creative necessity” and “ethical necessity” mean the same
thing or that they can be shown through analysis that they do. The necessity in question
is not simply the function of the meaning of words; it is a substantive metaphysical claim.
17
Although it is not a concern that Parfit raises, it might be objected that while this
provides motivation to take the Axiarchic step, it also undercuts it. If the Axiarchist is
right, the creative efficacy of the ethical is a necessity. In which case, isn’t only the best truly
possible? Won’t this produce modal collapse, leaving us with the Spinozistic conclusion
that the best is the only possible world? That may be. And it may be that the Axiarchist
is best off simply setting about making that consequence more palatable. I think that may
not be necessary, but because this issue falls outside of Parfit’s concerns, I will not pursue
it farther here.
18
Whether we have the right kind of necessity to put a satisfying end to the relevant
why-questions is taken up in the last two parts of the essay where we consider, respectively,
Axiarchism’s claim to ultimacy and the question of whether or not the Axiarchic principle
must rule.
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Axiarchism and Ultimacy
My second objection grows out of the first in the sense that it seems that
mislocating the source of Axiarchism’s explanatory power is what leads
Parfit to mistake the nature and, thereby, the force of Axiarchism’s claim
to being an ultimate explanation.
Consider one of Parfit’s other Selectors. Again, let’s use Maximality. If
that explanatory possibility obtains, then this world is the fullest and it
was selected for this feature. But we can then ask, why does this explanatory possibility obtain rather than some other, say, Simplicity? Of course,
it might just be a brute fact that it obtains. But, Parfit argues, it need not
be. It could be that this explanatory possibility obtains because it has some
feature which explains why it obtains.19 In other words, it may itself have
been selected by some higher-order Selector possibility. Perhaps Maximality was selected because it produces the greatest variety of beings. In
that case, Variety is the higher Selector principle. We now face the possibility of a regress of explanatory principles. But Parfit’s view is that this
doesn’t mean that we haven’t made some progress. After all, if we knew
Maximality to be true, then we would have some explanation of why the
world exists, but the regress of explanatory possibilities means that we
don’t have an ultimate explanation.
In response, Axiarchists might claim that their view is immune to this
concern. Axiarchists tell us that the reason the world exists is because so is
best. But when we ask why this is the explanatory possibility that obtains,
they might answer, because that is best. And when we ask, in turn, why this
explanatory hypothesis obtains we get the answer, because that is best,
and so on. In this way, we might regard the Axiarchic principle as “self
validating,” as Nicholas Rescher puts it. But this strategy, Parfit argues,
won’t work. What we have now is a series of explanatory truths, and so
now we need an explanation of why this series obtains rather than another
series or no series at all. The root of the problem, as Parfit sees it, is the
following.
What could select between these possibilities? Might goodness be the highest Selector because that is best, or non-arbitrariness be the Selector because
that is the least arbitrary possibility? Neither suggestion, I believe, makes
sense. Just as God could not make himself exist, no Selector could make
itself the one that, at the highest level, rules. No Selector could settle whether
it rules, since it cannot settle anything unless it does rule.20

There are a number of important things going on in this passage that
need to be addressed, but the first thing to say is that I agree that appealing to a series of Selector principles (Axiarchic or otherwise) will not
solve the problem. To explain more clearly why, but also why I don’t think
this point effects Axiarchism’s claim to being an ultimate explanation, I
19
20

Parfit, On What Matters, 644.
Ibid..

AXIARCHISM AND SELECTORS

419

believe it will be helpful to note that Parfit’s point here bears an ironic
resemblance to a point made by the seventeenth-century Axiarchist Ralph
Cudworth. In his A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality,
Cudworth is concerned to refute ethical voluntarism, or as he describes it,
the view that “all moral good and evil, just and unjust are mere arbitrary
and factitious things, that are created wholly by will.”21 In the course of
making his case, he argues that even when it comes to positive laws it is
not the will of a ruler that obliges one to obey. Because,
laws and commands do not run thus to will that this or that thing shall
become just or unjust, obligatory or unlawful, or that men shall be obliged
or obey; but only to require that something be done or not done. . . . For it
was never heard of that any one founded all his authority of commanding
others, and others’ obligation or duty to obey his commands, in a law of his
own making, that men should be required, obliged, or bound to obey him.
[Because] if it should be imagined that anyone should make a positive law to
require that others should be obliged or bound to obey him, everyone would
think such a law ridiculous and absurd. For if they were obliged before, then
this law would be in vain and to no purpose. And if they were not before
obliged, then they could not be obliged by any positive law, because they
were not previously bound to obey such a person’s commands.22

First the resemblance. Then the irony. The resemblance between Cudworth’s point and Parfit’s is that in both cases the complaint is that we
have a boot-strapping problem. In Cudworth’s case, the would-be ruler
can’t solve his authority problem by issuing a second-order demand that
his first-order demand ought to be obeyed because then we’ll just want
to know why we are obliged to obey this second-order demand. The only
way such a demand would be obligating is if we were already obliged
to obey his demand. In which case, the second-order demand would be
superfluous. It wouldn’t serve to validate the first-order demand. And,
obviously, the problem is not removed by issuing a series of higher-order
demands. A person cannot make his claim to authority self-validating;
even an infinite series of demands to rule won’t make one ruler. In Parfit’s
case the complaint is that the situation is much the same when it comes
to Selector principles. No principle, not even the Axiarchic principle, can
be validated by appealing to the same principle only at higher-level. But
Cudworth’s argument suggests that the situation is even worse than Parfit
thinks. If the first-order principle needed validation, then it still needs it
even with a second-order principle in place. The second-order principle is
entirely impotent. Just as in the case of the would-be ruler’s second-order
demand, introducing a second-order principle doesn’t even manage to
push our problem back a step.

21
Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (New York: Cambridge, 1996) 18.
22
Ibid., 18–19
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Now the irony. The irony lies in the fact that the point of Cudworth’s
argument is not that this is an unsolvable problem, but that this is a
problem for the Axiarchist’s arch enemy, the ethical voluntarist. There can
be binding positive laws because there can be genuine ruling authorities.
We have such when “natural justice or equity . . . gives to one the right
or authority of commanding, and begets in another duty and obligation
to obedience.”23 Justice itself enjoys underived authority. If one’s rule is
founded upon justice, Cudworth is claiming, then his commands are
genuinely authoritative, and one is obliged by them.
That’s the magic of the ethical. It’s not that ethical requirements merely
demand something in the way that I might demand that you bring me my
coffee. They demand with authority. And that authority is underived. No
further backing for their right to rule is called for. The Axiarchist principle is not “self-validating.” However, we might, if we like, say that the
question, “Why does the Axiarchic principle rule?” is self-answering. We
can say it is self-answering in the same way we can say that the question,
“Why be moral?” is self-answering. To say that question is self-answering
is not to appeal to a further justifying principle. For instance, it is an ethical
requirement that you must not cause unnecessary suffering. Of course, it
is true that if one were to ask, “Why should I do what this ethical requirement demands?” we might respond, “Because it would be wrong not to!”
But it would be delivered with a difficult-to-hide tone of exasperation. The
exasperation is warranted because you are not answering this illegitimate
request for justification by offering a second-order principle that gives the
ethical requirement the power to oblige. You’re answering that illegitimate
question by trying to get your interlocutor to recognize that it is illegitimate by, however ineffectually, getting them to recognize their natural
obligation not to cause unnecessary suffering. To adapt Bishop Butler’s
famous description of conscience, the ethical is “in kind and in nature,
supreme” and “bears its own authority of being so.”24
The key point here is the reason that generation after generation of
philosophers have looked to the ethical realm for an ultimate explanation
of existence is not merely because ethical truths are necessary truths but
because of the peculiar, non-logical kind of necessity they enjoy. When it
comes to ethical requirements, their necessity is a function of their natural
authority. One does not come to recognize the necessity of something such
as it is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering by coming to recognize that
its negation implies a contradiction. You come to recognize value’s necessity when you recognize its authority. And what it takes to recognize its
authority is to recognize that you are obliged by it; you must recognize that
it does, in fact, rule. Value’s peculiar form of necessity is grounded in its
natural Sovereignty. The Axiarchist’s idea is then to ground the principle
Ibid., 18.
Joseph Butler, “Sermon II: Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience,” in The Works
of Bishop Butler, ed. J. H. Bernard (London and NewYork: Macmillan and Co. 1900) vol. I, 45.
23
24
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of the world’s existence as the ruling principle upon the kind of necessity
provided by the natural Sovereignty of the ethical.
When it comes to Axiarchism and Axiarchism alone, there is no call for
higher-order Selector principles. Therein lies the force of Axiarchism’s claim
to being an ultimate explanation. Parfit’s abstraction obscures this force.
That Value Cannot Fail and the State of the Debate
Finally, the preceding can be used to defend the claim that not only does
value rule reality, it could not fail to rule. The good is necessarily efficacious. Against this, Parfit objects that that’s hard to believe because “while
it is inconceivable that undeserved suffering could have failed to be in
itself bad, it is clearly conceivable that value might have failed to rule, if
only because it seems so clear that value does not rule.”25
In light of the preceding, I think, this gets the dialectic wrong. Again,
according to the Axiarchist, value’s peculiar form of necessity is grounded
in its natural Sovereignty. You recognize the necessity of the ethical by
recognizing its authority and that means recognizing that you are obliged
by it; you accept its Sovereignty. So, since Parfit accepts both that undeserved suffering could not fail to be bad and that Selector hypotheses are
genuinely explanatory, and since the Axiarchist’s Selector is the only viable
Selector, the question that seemingly unnecessary suffering raises is, how
could it be possible for value to fail to rule?26 Parfit will owe the Axiarchist an
answer to that question. In turn, the Axiarchist will owe Parfit an answer
to the problem of evil. These strike me as comparably difficult tasks.27
Florida State University

Parfit, On What Matters, 643–644.
The Axiarchist, as we know, says that it could not. Value rules necessarily; it is metaphysically necessary that the best be. So this must be only seemingly unnecessary suffering.
27
I would like to thank David McNaughton, Thomas Flint, and two anonymous referees
for Faith and Philosophy for their helpful advice and feedback.
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